總結
討論主要集中在槓桿的使用和經濟週期的位置上。雖然低利率應該促進槓桿的大量使用，但由於疫情和政府的大規模財政介入，實際情況並非如此。政府成為了主要的槓桿持有者，這帶來了潛在的經濟風險。企業在這段時期內槓桿率降低，顯示出相對健康的財務狀況。討論還涉及到政府如何處理債務和可能的貨幣價值問題，以及這一切如何影響經濟週期的長短和穩定性。
- 槓桿和經濟週期的探討： 問及目前槓桿的位置和經濟週期的階段。
- 低利率下的槓桿使用： 儘管長期低利率環境，槓桿的增加並未如預期般爆炸性增長。
- 疫情對財政和槓桿的影響： 疫情期間，政府和企業的資產負債表因財政轉移而加強，政府槓桿增加。
- 量化寬鬆政策的角色： 聯準會在兩次經濟危機中透過購買債券來穩定經濟，增加了其負債。
- 企業槓桿的變化： 當前企業槓桿比過去低，顯示出企業資產負債表的健康狀況。
- 政府槓桿的擔憂： 討論政府槓桿的風險和政府的經濟支持能力，政府不賺錢並通過印鈔來償還債務。
- 經濟周期的延長： 探討政府吸收其他部門槓桿的可能性和經濟周期可能的延長。
- 貨幣接受度和匯率問題： 討論貨幣的全球接受度和匯率對政府印鈔能力的影響。
逐字稿
Q
Can we finish on leverage and where we are in the cycle?
This great line in your memo, the mother's milk of rapid expansion and speculation.
If we reflect on the last, let's say, 10, 14 years, you would imagine that in a decade-long period of ultra low interest rates, you would have had this explosion in leverage.
There are several reasons for that. But this period has been quite odd because we then had the pandemic, which led to the strengthening of balance sheets for both corporates and households off the back of a monster fiscal transfer.
And a question I think that Lisa and I hear a lot, Howard, is where is the leverage now?
Where is the leverage now?
最後，我們可否來討論「槓桿」以及我們目前於經濟週期中的所在位置？
您的備忘錄中有一句很棒的話，它是快速擴張和投機的母乳。
如果我們回顧過去十幾年，您會想像在超低利率的十年期間，會有杠桿的爆炸性增長。
這有幾個原因。但這一時期相當奇怪，因為我們隨後經歷了大流行，這導致企業和家庭的資產負債表因巨額財政轉移而得到加強。
還有一個問題，我認為莉莎和我經常聽到的，霍華德，現在的杠桿在哪裡？
現在的杠桿在哪裡？
A
Well, we know that the leverage is in the government, that the government has taken on a lot of leverage as part of its rescue mechanism.
We had two serious problems, the global financial crisis to kick off that low rate period you're talking about, and then the pandemic to bookend it. And in both cases, the Fed discovered something called quantitative easing or the buying of bonds. And it really did a great job of saving the economy on both occasions, but it loaded up its balance sheet with debt.
And corporate balance sheets are generally OK. If you look at leverage buyouts, which is something that's very important to us, the leverage on those is lower than it historically has been. In the 90s, it was 70%, 75% debt, 25% equity in most companies. In the 80s, it was 95%, 5%. And today, it's more like 60%, 40%. So the companies themselves are generally less levered.
嗯，我們知道杠桿在政府身上，政府作為其救援機制的一部分承擔了大量的杠桿。
我們有兩個嚴重的問題，全球金融危機開啟了你所說的低利率時期，然後是大流行病作為其尾聲。在這兩種情況下，聯邦儲備系統（Fed）發現了所謂的量化寬鬆（quantitative easing）或買入債券的措施。它確實在這兩個場合都做得很好，挽救了經濟，但它使自己的資產負債表負債累累。
而且企業的資產負債表一般都還可以。如果你看看槓桿收購 LBO，這對我們來說很重要，這些收購的槓桿比歷史上低。在90年代，大多數公司的債務是70%、75%，股權是25%。在80年代，是95%，5%。而今天，更像是60%，40%。所以公司本身一般槓桿較低。
Q
Is it too simplistic to say if the increase in leverage has been on the sovereign balance sheet, that's where the risk is? How do you frame that? How do you think about that?
說槓桿增加主要在主權資產負債表上，這就是風險所在，這種說法會不會太簡化了？您如何構建這個問題？您怎麼看待這個問題？
A
Well, first of all, I don't invest in sovereigns.
And the trouble is that in sovereigns, other things matter. When we look at companies, we ask, do they make money? Will they make money? Will they be able to pay their debt?
Governments don't make money. They're not expected to make money. And they pay their debt by running the printing press.
So that's a very different function. And then they have the ability of extending the cycle at the same time. I think this is what I'm trying to get my head around.
首先，我不投資於主權債券。
問題是，在主權債券中，其他因素很重要。當我們評估公司時，我們會問，他們能賺錢嗎？他們將來能賺錢嗎？他們能夠償還債務嗎？
政府不賺錢。他們不應該賺錢。他們通過運行印鈔機來償還債務。
所以這是一個非常不同的功能。然後他們同時有能力延長週期。我認為這是我正在努力理解的事情。
Q
If they've absorbed basically the leverage that existed elsewhere, and they are less exposed to the challenges of companies that you would invest in, are you thinking of a much longer cycle as a consequence?
如果他們基本上吸收了其他地方存在的杠桿，並且他們不太容易受到你會投資的公司所面臨的挑戰的影響，你是否考慮到這將導致一個更長的週期？
A
Well, I don't think governments can keep us aloft forever.
And then the other question is, are the currencies acceptable to the world? And at price, at broad price, you know, an exchange rate is a price. The dollar-euro exchange rate is the amount of dollars that people will pay to get a euro. And if that goes off the rails, then maybe they can't print as much or have other indigenous problems.
So again, multi-factor, not one.
嗯，我不認為政府可以永遠讓我們保持飛行。
然後另一個問題是，貨幣是否為世界所接受？而且以價格，廣泛的價格，你知道，匯率是一個價格。美元-歐元匯率是人們支付以獲得歐元的美元數量。如果那出了問題，那麼他們可能無法印製更多或有其他本土問題。
所以再次說，這是多因素的，不只一個。
本文經 GPT-4 與 Whisper 協助整理。